Research

Download: https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/66/3/sqac050/6679369

Status: Published (International Studies Quarterly)

Abstract: Data limitations on the campaign histories and organizational characteristics of smaller armed groups often leads scholars to omit key information about these actors in the study of terrorism and insurgency. This risks introducing selection bias into our empirical understanding of political violence. This article addresses these gaps by introducing an original dataset on 1,202 armed groups that operated in 124 countries between 1970 and 2012. It outlines the dataset’s construction and highlights some of the new group-level variation within it using a principal component analysis. It then showcases its comparabilities to existing datasets along with a replication analysis of state sponsorship and armed group duration.  The dataset creates substantial opportunities for developing and testing new theories about terrorism, insurgency, and civil war.

Download: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/20531680221091436

Status: Published (Research and Politics 2022)

Abstract: Do poor economic conditions cause militant campaigns? Conventional wisdom suggests negative economic shocks should increase the likelihood of rebel campaigns and civil conflict, but existing research finds little to no support for this claim. This paper suggests these results arise for two reasons. First, scholars conflate when campaigns form and when campaigns escalate to war. Second, scholars tend to ignore militant campaigns that never intensify into civil conflicts. I argue negative economic shocks increase the probability militant campaigns initially form, but these effects tend to dissipate before a campaign ever transitions to civil war. Using original data on the timing of 944 militant campaigns between 1970 and 2007, I estimate the effect of export commodity price shocks on the probability of formation. I test the underlying mechanisms by seeing how different shocks mobilize different social sectors to militancy and how these shocks affect campaign dynamics over time. The results show shocks increase the probability of formation due, in part, to hampering the state’s repressive capacity. However, the lag time between formation and civil conflict reduces the long-term effect of these shocks. These findings advance understanding about the causes of political violence and risks of economic shocks.

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Status: Working Paper

Abstract: When do armed groups launch violent militant campaigns? Armed groups organize on average for 2.5 years before launching violent militant campaigns, but when and why they decide to start fighting remains relatively unclear. This paper treats violence onset as a strategic decision on the part of armed groups. I argue an armed group initiates violence when it accumulates the minimum level of resources to credibly challenge the state. The speed at which an armed group grows into a credible threat depends on its latent capabilities, its operational environment, and the interaction of these two factors. Using an original dataset on 1,202 militant campaigns, I identify different observable characteristics which can facilitate this acquisition. I then test how these factors affect the risk of violence onset using a multilevel discrete hazard analysis. The results show armed groups tend to initiate violence sooner when they have previous combat experience. Environmental conditions only matter in the absence of prior combat experience. This paper advances understanding about the causes of political violence and timing of conflict.

Download: https://bit.ly/3DQm47u

Status: Forthcoming (Journal of Conflict Resolution)

Abstract: Within the terrorism and insurgency literature, splinter groups have a reputation for being incredibly violent due to their extremist preferences, but few empirical tests have assessed this claim. In this paper, we address three inter-related questions to test the conventional wisdom: Do splinter groups conduct more attacks than other types of armed groups? Under what conditions is splinter violence more prevalent? And, finally, why do splinter groups behave this way? Using cross-national organizational data on 1,202 armed groups, we show that splinter groups conduct more attacks than non-splinter groups, but only across countries. Within countries, splinter groups are no more violent. Additionally, splinter attacks are no more prevalent than non-splinter attacks around opportunities for spoiling new peace agreements or outbidding in fragmented conflict environments. To explain why splinter groups are only sometimes more violent than other armed groups, we develop and test two competing mechanisms. On the one hand, splinter groups may be more ideologically extremist, resulting in more violent campaigns to intimidate opponents. On the other hand, splinter groups may be organizationally stronger due to combat experience, resulting in lower organizational costs to fighting. Using genetic matching techniques, we test these two stories and show that organizational capacity, not extremism, drives splinter violence. These results advance understanding about political extremism and the consequences of splintering for armed conflict.

Download: https://bit.ly/3lP7Cqr

Status: Working Paper

Abstract: Do civil wars in neighboring countries increase the risk of civil conflict at home? Despite some evidence of contagion effects from the Arab Spring and the Color Revolutions, scholars still disagree over how and even whether militant violence spreads. We argue this debate exists, in part, because of a lack of fine-grained data about lower-level militant campaigns, which had the potential to escalate into national revolutions. This paper develops a new theory to explain both when and why political uprisings spillover by disaggregating along conflict intensity. We argue that contagion effects increase the likelihood that armed groups mobilize to challenge the state, but state reactions minimize the escalation of these conflicts. The paper derives a series of observable predictions about under what conditions contagion effects are most likely to emerge and test these hypotheses on an unprecedented, cross-national dataset of approximately 1,200 militant campaigns between 1970-2012.

Download: https://irismalone.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Uncertainty.pdf

Status: Working Paper

Abstract: Why do some armed group campaigns escalate to civil war, while others do not? Only 27% of campaigns between 1970 and 2012 ever became violent enough to surpass the threshold commonly used to demarcate “civil conflict.” Drawing on insights from financial economics, I develop the efficient conflict market theory. I argue this variation occurs because of an information problem. States neutralize potential civil war threats on the basis of observable characteristics about an armed group’s prospective strength, but two scenarios make it harder to get this decision right, increasing the risk of civil war. I identify a set of group-level risk indicators for civil war and apply machine learning methods to test the predictive ability of these indicators. The results show observable information poorly predicts escalation to civil war in strong states, but not weak states. Further, less visible campaigns are more associated with civil war. These findings advance understanding about why civil wars begin and the effect of uncertainty on conflict. 

Download: https://irismalone.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/TimingCivilWarEscalation.pdf

Status: Working Paper

Abstract: When do armed groups escalate their campaigns to civil war? Some armed groups operate for years before launching insurgencies, while other armed groups rapidly transition to war. I explain this variation in terms of when an armed group begins guerrilla operations. These violent activities have two competing effects: it builds a group’s capabilities to fight, but also reveals information about those capabilities to the state. Consequently, an armed group is most likely to escalate its campaign to civil war early on because the state is most uncertain over whether to act. I measure variation in armed group activities by leveraging overlaps in the population of armed groups across different conflict datasets. I apply Markov Chain modeling techniques to estimate the probability of civil war at any given time given information about the current state of an armed group’s campaign. I also examine how the timing of civil war differs across rebel groups. The results show the probability of civil war spikes during the first two to three years of a campaign then dissipates. These findings advance scholarly understanding about stochastic processes and conflict escalation.

Download: https://irismalone.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Legibility_and_Insurgent_Violence.pdf

Status: Working Paper

Abstract: Why do counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics reduce insurgent violence in some areas, but not others? Existing research suggests COIN is more effective when security forces have enough information necessary to detect and capture potential insurgents. While existing literature links COIN effectiveness to the quantity of information, it has not paid the same due attention to the \emph{quality} of information. I develop and test an argument that suggests security forces condition their efforts based on beliefs about who is an insurgent fighter, but poor quality information makes it harder to calibrate the necessary level and direction of effort to take. Poor legibility moderates COIN effectiveness in reducing insurgent violence. I test this prediction using original micro-level incident data from British military situation reports during the Malayan Emergency. I estimate how varying degrees of legibility about insurgent fighters across districts impacted insurgent violence. The results advance understanding about information problems and COIN effectiveness.

Download: https://bit.ly/3KjvSKy

Status: Under Review

Abstract: How do policy-makers evaluate the threat of emerging militant groups? Existing explanations predict policy-makers rely on costly signals to guide threat assessments, but emerging militant groups often have incentives to misrepresent their strength, producing noisy signals instead. We develop an alternative argument that policy-makers assess the risk of emerging militants groups based on two factors: memory of comparable cases and relative bandwidth capacity. We identify different international and domestic events which shape these factors and measure their prevalence using an unsupervised text analysis of declassified intelligence estimates. We further trace the mechanism through a case study of the 1979 Herat Rebellion in Afghanistan, where Soviet and American policy-makers reached opposing conclusions about the same militant group. Our findings advance understanding about the effect of uncertainty on threat perception.

Download: https://bit.ly/3hMl9fv

Status: Under Review

Abstract: Why do states sponsor some armed groups, but not others? Conventional wisdom suggests states tend to sponsor ideologically-similar armed groups to mitigate moral hazard problems. However, 64% of sponsored groups have neither shared ethnic nor shared ideational ties with their state backer. To reconcile this discrepancy, we develop and test an alternative explanation of state sponsorship. We argue a state sponsors different groups conditional on its desired foreign policy goals. When a state seeks expansionist aims, shared ideology is an informative signal of suitability for support. However, when a state pursues subversive aims, shared ideology is less informative than other selection criteria. We use a multi-method approach to test this logic. First, we employ an original dataset on the external ties of 1,432 armed groups operating around the world to more precisely determine under what conditions shared ideological ties matter. Second, we utilize internal documents from Saddam Hussein’s regime to analyze the decision-making behind Iraq’s support for varying types of armed groups during his reign. Using this multi-method approach, we highlight how different foreign policy interests drive state support for disparate types of armed groups. The results contribute to scholarship on proxy warfare, transnational terrorism, and foreign policy.

Download: https://bit.ly/3agraQU

Status: Working Paper

Abstract: Why do political shocks increase the risk of civil war in some cases, but not others? Extant scholarship suggests sudden political changes increase the risk of civil war onset by reducing barriers to mobilization and insurgency formation. However, shocks can elicit a broad range of reactions by potential non-state challengers, often within the same country. We develop and test a theory about the conditions under which political shocks increase the risk of civil war. We argue that the risk of civil war depends on whether a shock reduces an actor’s relative influence and the actor’s sensitivity to that shift. We identify organizational attributes that increase a challenger’s exposure to a negative shock (e.g. former regime ties) and test these predictions using an original cross-national dataset of armed groups that operated around the world between 1970-2012. These findings advance understanding about conflict processes and the causes of civil war.

Download: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03050629.2022.2016736

Status: Published (International Interactions 2022)

Abstract: Can history predict the escalation of future violence? This research note evaluates the use of a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) for the Violence Early Warning System (ViEWS) Prediction Competition. Existing research on civil conflict shows violence is a persistent and recurring process, often shaping the direction of future conflicts. Building on this insight, I build a RNN model to examine how well historical patterns in conflict predict long-term trends. A RNN is a simple, but powerful machine learning tool for time series forecasting due to its capacity to learn long sequences of information. The results show that the model produces relatively accurate forecasts in weak and failing states, consistent with existing research on “conflict traps.” The model struggles to predict new civil conflicts, consistent with informational theories of conflict onset. The results provide important lessons for conflict forecasting and demonstrate opportunities for RNN applications in future political science research.

Status: Published (International Studies Quarterly, 2019)

Abstract: Conventional wisdom about economic interdependence and international conflict predicts increasing opportunity costs make war less likely. But some wars occur after trade flows grow. Why? We develop a model that shows a nonmonotonic relationship exists between the costs and probability of war when there is uncertainty about resolve. Under these conditions, increasing the costs of an uninformed party’s opponent has a second-order effect of exacerbating informational asymmetries about that opponent’s willingness to maintain peace. We derive precise conditions under which war can occur more frequently and empirically showcase the model’s implications through a case study of Sino-Indian relations from 1949 to 2007. This finding challenges how scholars traditionally believe economic interdependence affects the probability of war—instruments like trade do not solely mediate incentives to fight through opportunity costs.

Status: Published (Research and Politics, 2021)

Abstract: Many theories of war predict conflict becomes more likely as a state increasingly values the prize at stake. This article showcases an important limit. If — as in many cases — a state has uncertainty over its opponent’s material cost of fighting, then increasing the opponent’s valuation can decrease the probability of war. Why? Uncertainty condenses the various types’ reservation values, reducing the peace premium, and incentivizing a proposer to make safer offers. We also recover an analogous result under some conditions with uncertainty over power. The results indicate that higher valuations of the prize do not have a clear-cut relationship with the probability of war.

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Abstract: This report summarizes the results of two machine learning prototype models that forecast the location of (1) domestic extremist groups and (2) active shooting incidents.
• The domestic extremism model forecasts a group’s area of operations with 96% accuracy and 85% sensitivity rate.
• The active shooter model forecasts incident locations with 91-92% accuracy and 51-71% sensitivity rate.
• The results suggest community-level risk factors are highly predictive of extremist operations and incidents.
• Prioritizing resources towards high-risk areas and supporting community-based awareness programs may mitigate these vulnerabilities.

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Abstract: How has maritime security evolved since 2001, and what challenges exist moving forward? This report provides an overview of the current state of maritime security with an emphasis on port security. It examines new risks that have arisen over the last twenty years, the different types of security challenges these risks pose, and how practitioners can better navigate these challenges. Building on interviews with 37 individuals immersed in maritime security protocols, we identify five major challenges in the modern maritime security environment: (1) new domains for exploitation, (2) big data and information processing, (3) attribution challenges, (4) technological innovations, and (5) globalization. We explore how these challenges increase the risk of small-scale, high-probability incidents against an increasingly vulnerable Marine Transportation System (MTS). We conclude by summarizing several measures that can improve resilience-building and mitigate these risks.

Abstract: Why do contemporary Racially-Motivated Violent Extremist (RMVE) movements champion “leaderless resistance,” and how can practitioners combat this organizational strategy? To answer this question, we draw on insights from military planning to identify why this online network structure provides the RMVE community its primary source of power, or “center of gravity.” We then use this information to deconstruct the movement’s operational activities including its critical capabilities and critical requirements to perpetrate these actions. Based on these requirements, we identify key vulnerabilities to undercut the movement’s resilience and growth as well as the most effective policy interventions.